A Privacy-Preserving Secure Framework for Electric Vehicles in IoT using Matching Market and Signcryption by Kumar, Gulshan et al.
0018-9545 (c) 2020 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI 10.1109/TVT.2020.2989817, IEEE
Transactions on Vehicular Technology
JOURNAL OF LATEX CLASS FILES, VOL. 11, NO. 4, DECEMBER 2012 1
A Privacy-Preserving Secure Framework for
Electric Vehicles in IoT using Matching Market and
Signcryption
Gulshan Kumar, Rahul Saha, Mritunjay Kumar Rai, William J. Buchanan, Reji Thomas, G. Geetha, Tai
Hoon-Kim and Joel J. P. C. Rodrigues, Fellow, IEEE,
Abstract—The present world of vehicle technology is inclined to
develop Electric Vehicles (EVs) with various optimized features.
These vehicles need frequent charging which takes a longer
time to charge up. Therefore, scheduling of vehicles in charging
stations is required. Besides, the information of the EVs and its
location is also stored by the charging stations and therefore
creates a concern of EV privacy. Various researches are going on
to solve these problems; however, an efficient privacy-preserving
solution is less practiced till date. In this paper, a framework for
Electric Vehicle (EV) charging is discussed. The framework uses
the concept of Matching Market to identify a charging station and
uses the lattice-based cryptography for secure communications.
The matching market considers multiple factors to provide the
best allocation of charging station and cryptography ensures
security and privacy preservation. The use of lattice-based cryp-
tographic hash SWIFFT avoids heavy computation. This usage
of matching market and lattice cryptography, more specifically
signcryption for EV charging framework are the highlights of
the solution and add-ons to the novel features. Overall, the
presented framework is efficient in terms of computation and
communication cost, satisfaction ratio, slot ratio, charging latency
and load balancing index. The performance metrics are compared
with recent developments in this field.
Index Terms—Electric Vehicle, privacy, signcryption, lattice,
cryptography, security
I. INTRODUCTION
E lectricity is preferred for motor-vehicle propulsion as itprovides more comfort, simplicity in design and effi-
ciency in operation. Proof of the existence of Electric Vehicles
(EVs) is known since the mid of 19th century and the present
interest in 21st century is mainly due to environmental concern
[1]. Previously except a few cars and small electric trains
with distance restrictions, EVs were unable to gather much
interest due to the unavailability of batteries’ high power and
energy density with large cycleability and high rate capability.
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This allowed fossil fuel to dominate the transportation sector.
However, the introduction of high-density Li-ion batteries
towards the end of 20th century rejuvenated the interest in
EVs once again. In fact, transportation technology and the
renewable energy sector with Li-ion batteries are going to
be the hope for a gasoline-free 21st century to address all
environmental concerns. Increasing demand for EVs has been
predicted; a giant leap from 2% of the global share in 2016
to 22% in 2030 as environmentally benign and cheap Li-ion
technology with desirable properties are expected to fulfill the
requirements of the transportation sector [2].
To strengthen the deployment of EVs worldwide, charg-
ing centres like present gas stations should be made more
available and the locations should be mapped [3][4]. This
has made EVs to get connected with the distributed electric
grid and networks. The Grid-to-Vehicle (G2V) and Vehicle-
to-Grid (V2G) communication technology help in the process
of selecting the electric grid for efficient charging of the
EVs [5][6]. In future, this G2V and V2G are going to be
consolidated with Internet-of-Things (IoTs) to make the total
infrastructure functioning in a smoother way with the least
human intervention and less time consumption [7]. The main
objective for connecting the vehicle to the electric grid is to
charge the vehicle when required without wasting time in
waiting as charging a battery takes much more time than
filling a gas tank of gasoline vehicles. However, the EVs
provide load balancing through ‘valley filling’ and ‘peak
shaving’, frequency regulation, and back-up power. Various
researches are getting conducted on these services in the G2V
and V2G technology [8][9]. Furthermore, to execute these
services various Transport System Models (TSM) are closely
connected with electric grids or smart grids through various
means of Information and Communication Technology (ICT)
[10][11]. The advent of IoT with the goal of smoother and
easier processing of the system modeling and functioning has
made the ICT an adhesive component of TSM. Figure 1 shows
a logical representation of the connections among TSM, EV
and grids extending to the IoT. The figure depicts that EVs
are one of the components of vehicular networks which are
based on IoT; on the other side, the extension of electric grid
systems, “the smart grid”,is controlled through IoT. Therefore,
IoT is a prominent enabler of EVs and gaining popularity in
EV research community.
The continuous functioning of EV depends on the iden-
tification of the charging station in the vicinity before the
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Fig. 1. Logical representation of IoT enabling EVs
battery gets exhausted[12]. The EV charging infrastructure
also considers the controlling mechanism of the charging sta-
tion and accommodating the EV for a charging point. Various
researches are executed in this field at present and some are
efficient to be considered in the near future [13][14]. Moreover,
various energy management methods are executed by the
charging points for the ease of EV charging process and some
of the recent significant developments in this direction are
published elsewhere[15][16][17]. Along with these comforts
which came with this technology, security and privacy of
EV infrastructure are at threats. There are different active
entities in V2G network viz., the owner of the EV, the EV
battery, the power company, and the payment management
company. The EVs communicate with the electric grid through
a collector or data aggregator for charging their batteries at the
charging stations with minimum queuing time or to have an
optimum distance-time product. A data aggregator is a device
or set of devices that acts as a collector of available power
information of the vehicles. An aggregator also offers power
supply information to the EVs through the charging stations
based on various energy management and resource scheduling
algorithms. They are also enabled to access the authentication
and communication servers to coordinate the charging. Figure
2 explains the architecture of the overall V2G communication
process.
The use of Electric Vehicle (EV) is growing due to its
environmental benefits and easy technical maintenance and
obviously cost[18][19]. However, the limitation of battery
exhaustion, cycleability and rate capability (longer recharge
time) are the major concerns. As EVs are now the component
of IoT and smart grid, security has been attributed to the
concerning factors as well. An overall summary of attacks has
been shown in Table I for the V2G and G2V communication
architecture by considering the Internet of Electric Vehicles
(IoEV) [20][21].
From the table, it is clear that EVs are vulnerable more
for attacks when they communicate with the charging in-
frastructure networks. The critical security requirements of
the charging infrastructure are data maintenance and user
authentication, data confidentiality, and finally the privacy
of EVs. Therefore, a solution has been provided for the
secure and privacy-preserving framework for EVs in the
present paper. It is comprised of a matching market concept
used with multi-payoff convergence as a payoff. The lattice
cryptography is also used for a less complex cryptographic
process for accomplishing security requirements. The literature
background of these two concepts, matching market concept
and lattice cryptography along with the recent developments
are discussed in the next section. The contribution and novelty
of the proposed work are:
• A solution is provided for the optimization of EV allo-
cation to a charging station.
• Multi-factor payoff-based matching market is used for the
best allocation of charging stations.
• Lattice signcryption is applied for EV infrastructure com-
munication to reduce time consumption of the crypto-
graphic procedures and to withstand the quantum attacks.
• Thus, system stability and robustness against security
attacks are ensured.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
explains shows the recent state of the art. Section III explains
the proposed framework. Section IV discusses the experimen-
tal results and finally, the major conclusion drawn from the
presented study is given in Section V.
II. BACKGROUND AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
In this section, a basic understanding of the matching market
concept and signcryption and its applications are discussed
first. Recent security-privacy solutions for EVs are also given
in this section.
A. Matching market
The matching theory is a mathematical framework gener-
ally used for the economic understanding of the problem to
design a particular ‘market’ (considered as group of nodes
to generalize the concept). It deals with the analysis of the
formation of the beneficial relationships mutually developed
between the parties over a period of time. A matching function
is scientifically represented as a mathematical relationship
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Fig. 2. V2G and G2V communication architecture
TABLE I
ATTACKS ON EVS AND RELATED COMMUNICATION
Category Attack name Attack on
Vehicle-to-Sensor communication Jamming User Authentication, data availability
False data injection Data integrity
GPS deception Data integrity, confidentiality, privacy
Denial of Service Data availability
Vehicle-to-Vehicle communication Modification Data integrity, confidentiality
Sybil User Authentication
False data injection Data and user authentication, confidentiality, privacy
Eavesdropping Data availability
Black hole Data integrity, data authentication
Grey hole Data integrity, data authentication
Worm hole Data authentication, User authentication
Denial of Service Data availability
Vehicle-to-Infrastructure communication Replay Non-repudiation
Route information forgery Data integrity, confidentiality
Privacy Privacy
RSU spoofing Authentication
Duplicate Address Detection Authentication
Vehicle to Network communication DoS, MiTM, Spoofing Authentication
Physical Attacks Data integrity, privacy, confidentiality
Eavesdropping Data availability
Configuration Attacks Data integrity, confidentiality
between unmatched agents dealing with the same service.
The agents are classified into two types; the requester and
the acceptor. With a wide extension and feasibility of the
application, matching functions can be assumed to follow the
’Cobb–Douglas’ form [22]:





where c, a and b are positive constants. In this equation, ut
represents the number of requesters in a matching system at
a given time t, vt is the number of acceptors trying to fill the
requests of the requesters. The number of new relationships
(matches) created between requesters and acceptors (per unit
of time) is given by mt. The above theory can be expressed
as a bipartite graph as shown in Figure 3 for observing the
perfect matching with individual preferences.
Figure 3 shows an example with five requesters and five
acceptors with their preferences (indicating, for instance, that
the requester R1 has preferred allocators A1, A2 as acceptable
options, while the requester R4 only prefers acceptor A4).
The allocation or the relationship between a requester and an
acceptor should be formed in such a way that the acceptor
must be in the preference list of a requester. Since the
edges represent acceptable options for requesters, assigning
an acceptor to each requester is preferred in the present
case. This allows each requester is assigned an acceptor to
which the requester is connected by an edge. Figure 3 shows
such an assignment with the darkened edges indicating who
gets which acceptor. Such an assignment is considered as a
perfect matching [23]. Extending the concept of this perfect
matching with some valuations, prices associated with each
of the preference and allocation in the matching outcomes,
a payoff need to be maximized from the overall matching
system. For example, suppose that each acceptor i puts the
accepted relationship with a price pi > 0. If a requester j
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Fig. 3. Example of perfect matching
requests the acceptor i at this price, the requester’s payoff is
the valuation for this acceptor minus the amount of price the
requester has to pay: vij − pi, where vij is the valuation for
the acceptor i by the requester j. So, with a given a set of
valuations and prices, if requester j wants to maximize its
payoff, it will be waiting to be allocated to the acceptor i
for which vij − pi is maximized. Therefore, Nash equilibrium
is calculated for both the requester and accepter for which
they have maximized the payoff [24]. This nash equilibrium
leads to maximum payoff for acceptor and requester with
their respective preferences providing the solution stability.
Therefore, we have chosen this method in the present work
for allocating the best option of charging stations.
This matching market concept has been used in the present
study and customized as per the requirement of the proposed
framework. The allocation of an EV (requester) to a charging
station (acceptor) is based on the maximized payoff’ for
both the requester and the acceptor. Therefore developing a
market matching allocation scheme for EVs is considered
here. Generally, in matching market bipartite graph the number
of acceptors and requesters are to be equal; however, the
presented customized use of matching market is applicable to
any number of the acceptors and requesters which also adds
on to the novelty.
B. Signcryption
The security aspects are critical for any type of networking
applications and so with EV charging networks. Generally,
for all the security services, encryption and digital signature
are the two fundamental cryptographic tools that ensure the
security viz., confidentiality, integrity, and non-repudiation
[25].
Previously, a traditional method “signature-then-encryption”
involving public key has been used in which the message is
signed digitally and is then followed by encryption. However,
this method faces problems of low efficiency and high cost of
the combination. Besides, arbitrary combinations are question-
able sometimes for providing appropriate security provisions.
To overcome these problems, signcryption has been introduced
in 1997 [25]. ]. It has been developed as a cryptographic
primitive for performing the digital signature and encryption
functions simultaneously. Any signcryption scheme should
have some certain properties such as correctness, efficiency
in terms of computational cost and communication overhead,
security in terms of confidentiality, forward secrecy, unforge-
ability, non-repudiation, integrity and public verifiability. The
generic and logical functioning of signcryption are shown
in Figure 4. It shows a Public Key Generator (PKG) and
involvement of keys and other components for the signcryption
and unsigncryption process. PuA, PrA are the public and
private keys of the sender A and PuB , PrB are the public
and private keys of the receiver B.
Various researchers have developed efficient signcryption
schemes and extensions of the same are still in progress for
improving the security features. Some of the significant usage
of signcryption for IoT based applications have been discussed
in the literature [26][27][28]. Moreover, the advanced sign-
cryption schemes are also introduced recently in the form of
lightweight signcryption schemes [29][30] [31] [32][33].
In the proposed framework, a lattice based signcryption
for providing more security has been considered as lattice
cryptography is able to withstand against quantum attacks [34].
It has been observed that the advent of quantum computers
makes the existing cryptographic algorithms vulnerable if
factorization of large primes and other mathematical pro-
cesses are used. To make the security algorithms sustainable
against attacks, lattice-based cryptography is introduced. It
constructs cryptographic primitives involving lattices of data
points calculated by the integer linear combination basis
vectors, either in the construction itself or in the security proof.
Such constructions are currently important for post-quantum
cryptography as the Shortest Vector Problem (SVP) is hard to
solve. Lattice cryptography has shown successful derivations
of hash functions, public key systems and even signcryptions
that produce less computational cost and message overhead.
It provides lightness to the system’s complexity and hence,
chosen for the present work.
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Fig. 4. Logical representation of signcryption process
C. Recent developments
In this subsection, some significant recent development of
security solutions for EVs have been reviewed. The pros and
cons are notified for the selected existing security solutions and
the steps taken in the present study to solve the problems are
mentioned. The objective of the present work is to provide a
secure and privacy-preserving framework for electric vehicles
with the best suit charging point. Existing works related to
security and privacy, the energy distribution and the manage-
ment systems have been considered for this purpose.
Mutual authentication and blockchain-based secure framework
for EV charging has been recently introduced [35]. Bur-
rows–Abadi–Needham logic is used in this framework to pro-
vide anonymity and forward secrecy with efficient charging.
It also prevents the replay and the man-in-the-middle attacks
using automated validation of internet security protocols. With
the aforementioned advantages, the method suffers mainly
from latency with the increasing number of EVs and does not
provide the best option for a charging station recommenda-
tion. Another blockchain-based solution that considers mobile
charging concepts also came in recently [36]. The authors
propose an algorithm based on a double-objective optimization
model that maximizes the user’s satisfaction and minimizes
users’ cost. The method considers diverse metrics like the
location of charging centres, the time of waiting, and the
driving speed of EVs, etc. Though the blockchain provides
security, the method is unable to protect EVs’ privacy in a
suitable way. A reliable, automated blockchain-based protocol
that ensures privacy for EVs has been developed [37]. The
approach is reliable, automated and ensures privacy. The selec-
tion of stations is based on pricing and distance; however, the
load balance is not included. It also uses blockchain comprised
of EV’s demand and charging station’s bids. A priority-based
privacy-preserving solution has experimented with [38]. In this
third method, the selection of stations is based on pricing
and distance without considering the load balance. It also
considers of EV’s demand and charging station’s bids. A
priority-based privacy-preserving solution has been developed
based on three schemes, namely, multiauthority attribute-based
prioritization, e-payment and hierarchical authentication. [39].
Though privacy of the EVs is maintained the compromised
authority has not been addressed well enough to avoid false
priority claiming. The lightweight scheme is used for the
authentication process in this method and the hierarchical
construction for authentication may provide a bottleneck for
the performance with a huge number of EVs. Another recent
development using Lightweight Privacy-aware Power injection
and Communication (LPPC) scheme is applicable to V2G
architecture [40]. In this case, EVs use bids and secret keys for
different time slots. Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) is used
for the data aggregation and the hash function-based technique
is used for authenticity or/and integrity of the aggregated
bid. A privacy-preserving supplier matching EV charging
system is also considered in which the problem of information
leakage is handled by the solution using Biochromatic Mutual
Nearest Neighbour (BMNN) assignments of suppliers [41].In
this method, homomorphic encryption is used for hiding EV
information and dynamic environments are considered for the
simulation. The results are satisfactory, but the problem is with
assignments where the supplier and user profit need to be
maximized. A similar privacy-preserving approach applicable
for vehicle-to-grid uses anonymous credentials for privacy
[42].
Control on the usage of the third party and the fine-grained
hash chain based rewarding mechanism are beneficial for fair
exchange and non-repudiation. The certificate process needs
to be explored more for EVs as they are resource-constrained.
EVs are now also become part of the Intelligent Transport
System (ITS) and therefore their autonomous controlling is
another important research work. Such a significant work for
ITS ensuring privacy has been studied [43].
The privacy is provided by using location pseudonyms
of the EVs where they contact the trusted authority once
and then update their pseudonyms by themselves. It provides
less communication overhead in the network; however, the
approach fails to address the known pseudonyms attacks where
some compromised EVs may update the pseudonyms with a
predefined set of attack base[44].
Charging station allocation and energy management are
significant factors that affect EV charging systems. Such
developments with a hybrid power system have been studied
recently based on the combination of three control methods;
a fuzzy logic control, a flatness control and a rule-based
algorithm.Though energy management is addressed in this
method, the load balancing is not considered. Another energy
control model considers the decentralized system and flexible
charging demand uses the Lagrangian method and the alter-
nating direction multiplier [44]. With this technique, EVs are
able to decide their charging plan locally but the algorithm
faces the problem of load balancing. Some other distributed
control strategy for congestion control and other services for
EVs have been experimented for various aspects that affect
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the EV charging process [45][46][47].
A more recent development provides a scheduling mecha-
nism in the Charging Station (CS) with an economic cost and
reduced charging time for the EV [13]. Moreover, it avoids
third-party inclusion and ensures EV’s privacy and complex
information exchange between the EV and CS. The privacy
and security section of the approach needs to be explored
more.
The above discussion of the existing developments for EV
charging framework suggests that the research in this field is
still in infancy. The overall problems identified from the recent
literatures are: i) enery efficient charging station allocation and
optimization, ii) privacy preservation of EV information and,
iii) less complex cryptograhic processes. As EVs are energy
resource-constrained, an adaptable solution in the near future is
required to address the aforementioned problems. Therefore, a
novel framework using the matching market scheme and lattice
cryptography/signcryption for security services for future EVs
in IoT is presented here.
III. PROPOSED FRAMEWORK
The proposed framework (Figure 5) in the present study is
an extension from the basic network generally used, which is
discussed in the introduction with the help of Figure 2. At first,
EVs communicate with the aggregators and the aggregators
propagate the messages to the operators. This operator includes
communication servers, authentication server and the process-
ing server. It is this ‘operator’ which is responsible for the
allocation of the appropriate charging station to an EV based
on the market matching scheme with defined payoff function.
The aggregator knows only the pseudo-identity of the EV to
deliver privacy to the EV. The other information like location,
charging-discharging data and traceroute are encrypted while
communicating with the aggregator and the charging station;
however, operators are able to get the location of EVs via GPS
systems configured in the vehicles.
All operations start as EVs broadcast charge request mes-
sages CHRG : PID, RES, V . This message is encrypted
by the appropriate keys of the EVs and forwarded towards
the operator via aggregators and that EVs’ authentication is
then validated by the operator. As the message passes through
aggregators, aggregators’ authentication is also required for the
operator and then only the messages from EVs are processed
further for allocating a charging station. After the verification,
the operator executes the market matching and then allocates
the EV to a charging station having the defined preference
and maximum payoff. In this process aggregators’ identity is
verified at the EVs and messages are accepted accordingly.
Once the EV reaches the charging station and plugs in for
charging all the information are hashed and shared with
the charging station. The charging station stores the hashed
information and EV stores the charging station id and time
stamp.
In the process considered here, a vehicle is in the moving
mode with an average speed of 35-40 km/h and dynamic
decision from the operator is required. As per the schematics
shown in Figure 5, the EV broadcasts the message when
it is near to charging station 1, however, the operator allo-
cates charging station is 4 as per the moving direction and
speed of the vehicle. The overall functionalities are classified
into following subsections like initialization and registration,
authentication, allocation and charging. In the present case,
processing of the request from the EV to finally allocate a
charging station considers the assumption as:
• Operator centre is secured enough.
• Operator uses a secret channel for distributing keys.
• EVs and aggregators are non-secure and therefore need
proper authentication process.
A. Initialization Phase
The operator initializes the system and sets up the network
by configuring EV charging aggregators registered. The pro-
cess steps for the initialization and the algorithm for the key
generation are given below.
Step 1: The operator selects a base point G of order n on
the selected elliptic curve F over finite field q which is trans-
formed into a polynomial form F = (x, y) : y2 = (x3+ax+b)
(mod q). The order of n must be greater than 2160 and
satisfying n×G = I , where I is a point on F at infinity.
Step 2: The polynomial of degree n (poly(n)) calculated
in the previous step is then transformed into a vector B. A
random basis ℵag is calculated by hashing of the vector B
appended with aggregator’s ID and then randomly choosing m
bits; ℵag = (randm(hash(B||IDaggr)). IDaggr is generated
by the ICMetrics of the aggregator device.
Step 3: The lattice of the vector B is also calculated as:
L =∑mi=1 aivi, where ai ∈ R and vi ∈ B.
Step 4: SETLA key generation process is followed to
calculate the public-private keys for the aggregators [48]. The
key generation process is shown in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Key generation for Aggregators
1: Data ℵag,L
2: Result Kag+ = (t1, t2),Kag− = (s, e1, e2)
3: (s, e1, e2)← Rq,[1]
4: t1 ← ℵag.s+ e1
5: t2 ← L.s+ e2
6: return Kag+ and Kag−
In the Algorithm 1, Kag+ is the public key and Kag− is the
private key of the EV aggregator communication. Rq,[1] is the
well-known ring Rq = Zq[B]/[Bm+1] with q = 1 (mod 2n)
and have the set of elements in the range of [−1, 1]. s ∈ Zmq
such that s ∈ Rq and ei ∈ R = Z[B]/[p(B)] with coefficients
sampled from X with Gaussian distribution. Here, Zq denotes
residue class (mod q).
Step 5: Operator calculates its private-public key pair as:
Kopagg+ = Kag+.G and Kopagg− = Kag−.G where Kopagg+
is the public key and Kopagg− is the private key established
between the operator and an aggregator.
Step 6: Operator then sends the key pair: Kag+ and Kag−
and its own public key Kop+ to the aggregator.
The registration phase is executed once an EV wants to access
a charging system and wants to be part of the EV network. In
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Fig. 5. Proposed framework for EV charging
this case, EVs are also parts of vehicular networks. The steps
of registration are as followed.
Step 1: EV sends its own id EVID to the operator.
Step 2: The operator calculates H(EVID) and maps with
EVID and stores them in mapping repository.
Step 3: Operator generates two random numbers r1 and r2.
Step 4: Operator calculates Kop− = H(EVID||r1) and
Kev− = H(EVID||r2). H() is the family of SWIFFT hash
which is based on lattice cryptography as shown in [49]. The
use of SWIFFT is more powerful as compared to generic hash
functions and is able to withstand quantum key attacks. This
private key is also stored by the operator in hashed format for
verification process in later stage. The functioning of SWIFFT
is shown in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Private key generation for EVs
1: Data EVID||ri;Output : Kop−,Kev−
2: Result (Kop−,Kev−)
3: Convert EVID||ri into a collection of m polynomials pi
in a certain polynomial ring R with binary coefficients
4: Calculate Fourier coefficients for each pi
5: Define Fourier coefficients for each ai where ai is depen-
dent of on SWIFFT family
6: Point-wise multiply the Fourier coefficients of pi and ai
7: Use inverse Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) to obtain m
polynomials fi of degree < 2n
8: Compute f =
∑m
i=1 fi (mod p) Kop−,Kev− ← Convert
f to nlog(p) bits
Step 5: Operator calculates the public keys: Kop+ = Lr1.G
and Kev+ = Lr2.G.
Step 6: Operator sends Kop+,Kev−Kev+ to EV for further
communication using secret channel.
Therefore, we can say that, before the authentica-
tion phase, two sets of operator keys are initiated: one
set is working between operator and aggregator, i.e.
[Kopagg+,Kopagg−,Kag+,Kag−] and another set is working
between operator and EV, i.e. [Kop+,Kop−,Kev−,Kev+].
B. Authentication Phase
Authentication phase is executed between an EV and ag-
gregator when EV wants to access a charging system. A
common session key is generated after both the parties are
authenticated.
Step 1: EV generates a charging request message CHRG :
H(EVId), EVloc, Er, V,H(Kev−), where H(EVId) is hash of
the electric vehicle id, EVloc is the location of the EV given
by two-dimensional coordinates (xev, yev), Er is the residual
charge of the EV and V is the velocity of the EV. H() is the
lattice based SWIFFT hash function as shown in Algorithm
2. The vehicle encrypts the CHRG message with operator’s
public key Kop+,and broadcast it.
Step 2: The suitable aggregator in the vicinity of the
EV receives the encrypted CHRG message and sends to
the operator through signcryption process along with its id
IDaggr. Aggregator is not able to see the message due to
the unavailbility of the operator private key. The signcryption
process for aggregator is shown below in algorithm 3. The
aggregator generates a digital signature (R, s), of the mes-
sage [CHRG]Kev− and finally sends the signcrypted message
(R, s, c).
Step 3: Operation centre executes the unsigncryption pro-
cess as shown in Algorithm 4.
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Algorithm 3 Signcryption for aggregator
1: Data CHRGKop+ , H1, H2, G
2: Result y = (R, s, c)
3: Select k random←−−−−− RqP˜−, where Rq is the ring and P˜−
is the generator of the ring
4: Calculate k1 = k.P− and k2 = k.Kopagg+
5: Compute c = CHRGKop+⊕H1(k1, k2), where H1 : Rq×
Rq → Zq
6: Compute h = H2(c, k2), where H2 is a hash function in
SWIFFT family
7: Compute s = k/(h+Kag−) (mod q))
8: Compute R = hP˜−
Algorithm 4 Unsigncryption at operation centre
1: Data y = (R, s, c),Kopagg−
2: Result CHRGKop+
3: Compute k1 = (Kopagg−).s.R
4: Find the aggregator identity and use the corresponding
public key Kag+
5: Compute k2 = (Kopagg−).s.(Kag+)
6: Compute σ = (c, k2)
7: if (σ.Kag+ = R) then
8: accept the message
9: CHRGKop+ = c⊕H1(k1, k2)
10: end if
Note that, till the process described above aggregator is
unable to see the identity of the EV and also deals with an
encrypted version of the CHRG. Thus, privacy is preserved in
the proposed system from the aggregators.
Step 4: Operator decrypts the message [CHRGKop+ with
the its corresponding private key Kop−. It verifies the hashed
key and the hashed vehicle ID in its mapping repository;
if there is match, it considers the message as authenticated
with aggregator and EV and processes it further for allocation
calculation.
Step 5: It may happen that different aggregators have com-
municated the signcrypted message of CHRG to the operator
due to the dynamic location of EV. All such messages are
accounted by the operator to estimate the allocation of the
charging station as aggregators positions (Assuming Road Side
Units) are prefixed and under the observation of the operator.
C. Charging station allocation
The operator is responsible for the allocation of EV to
a particular charging point for every registered EV in the
network that requested charging. The operator executes the
charging station allocation based on distance, residual charge,
load at the charging station and waiting time at the charging
station. The allocated charging station must satisfy the require-
ments of minimum distance, minimum residual charge, load
balance and less waiting time. For this, the operator executes
an allocation scheme, notifies the best suitable charging station
to the aggregator and finally aggregator shares the information
with EV.
The transmission range of the EV and aggregator is con-
sidered as r1 and r2 respectively, assuming that r1 < r2.
The minimum distance between the two entities (EV and
aggregator) should be less than d = r2+r1. Figure 6 shows the
geometrical configuration considering the transmission range





where, d is the distance between an EV and aggregator and
m is the number of aggregators’ messages arrived for the same
CHRG.
The residual charge is another parameter to be considered.
If residual charge is too low, the EV is granted a priority.
In the proposed system 20% residual charge is considered as
a threshold value (Eth) after which the EV starts charging
request. The selection of 20% is based on experiment which
have been found sufficient for charging station to be allocated
to the EV. If an EV is having Eres too low (assuming that the
rate of charge discharge per unit distance is β), the discharged
charge for covering the min(d) distance must be less than
Eres. Therefore, the condition for energy payoff is calculated
as:
℘E = min[(Eth − Eres)− (d× β)] (3)
The charging time for EV is generally more as compared to
other charging systems. Considering the charging rate µ per
unit time and x is the total charge capacity of the vehicle,
the time taken for full charging is xµ time unit. A charging
station having the capacity of α number of vehicles. Suppose,
α vehicles are in process of charging simultaneously and when
they are filled up with ρ amount of charge the other vehicle


























The time of charging for θth vehicle, i.e. θx−ρµ is inversely
proportional to α which is the capacity of the charging station.
More the capacity, less the time for charging as waiting time
is reduced. The above equation suggests that if θ is more and
ρ is less then Twait increases significantly and thus generating
more congestion at a particular charging station and reducing
the overall system’s performance. Therefore, Twait should be
minimum for the vehicle going to be allocated to a charging
station.
These parameters are used by the operator for conceptual-
izing the matching market scheme as shown in the following
steps.




(xev − xagg)2 + (yev − yagg)2 (6a)
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A1 d11, E11, t11 NA d13, E13, t13
A2 d21, E21, t21 d22, E22, t22 NA
A3 d31, E31, t31 d32, E32, t32 d33, E33, t33





Step 2: Operator creates a payoff matrix at time instant t as
shown in Table II.
Table II shows the format of the payoff matrix. For example,
A1, A2 and A3 are the aggregators and EV1, EV2 and EV3 are
the electric vehicles. dij is the distance between an aggregator
i and vehicle j, Eij is the calculated charge consumption
between an aggregator i and vehicle j; and tij is the waiting
time for the j assigned to a charging station by aggregator i .
Step 3: Operator calculates two payoff functions (one for
EV ℘p and one for charging station ℘chrgst ) as:
℘p = dp + Cp +Wp (8)
where the priority for distance dp and priority for charge
consumption Cp are proportional to each other and the priority
for waiting Wp is the secondary. For the same dp and Cp,
Wp works as an enabler of allocation. These priorities are
calculated as:
dp = min(d) (9)
Cp = min(Econ) (10)
Wp = min(Twait) (11)
℘chrgst = max[(x− Econ)]× p] (12)
where, p is the price of charging per unit. The priority values
are either 0 or 1 to denote whether a particular EV is having
minimum distance, minimum energy and minimum waiting
time. The cumulative score of ℘p lies between 0 and 3. For
℘chrgst the maximum value is given priority of 1.
The cost of charging per unit p can be varied and dynamic
depending upon operators’ regulations and can be calculated
as: p = pcst−vEV where, pcst is the price by charging station
and vEV is the EV cost valuation which depends upon the EV
owner.
Step 4: Operator finally calculates the payoff of overall
allocation as:
℘a = max(℘p + ℘chrgst) (13)
Following the above explanation, the ℘a becomes within range
of 0 to 4 overall. This priority checking is an iterative process.
Step 5: Allocation in confirmed.
Step 6: Operator sends ALLOC :
[CSID, Aggloc, CSpayoff ] message signcrypted to the
EV via aggregator.
Let us consider a bipartite graph following the above payoff
matrix to understand the charging station allocation process.
In the example, aggregators A1 and A2 have forwarded the
message of signed CHRG and A3 has been added by the
operator based on the location of the vehicle received in
the message and velocity of the vehicle. Similarly, for EV2
vehicle, A2 is the aggregator that sends the signed message of
EV2 and for EV3 vehicle, A2 is the aggregator that sends the
signed message of EV3. A3 and A1 have been added by the
operator respectively, for EV2 and EV3. The bipartite graph
explains the preferences with respect to distance, charge and
waiting time as shown in Figure 7.
Note that, when we consider the parameters individually,
the allocation changes, but as per priority-based parameters the
final allocation may be the same or different. The allocation
of EV2 to A2 is static for every parameter; however, other
allocation has been changed. Individual parametric allocations
are not optimal and therefore, this proposed priority-based
matching market scheme for allocation is beneficial for getting
multi-factor allocation.
D. Charging phase
While transmitting of signcrypted ALLOC message, aggre-
gator works only as a forwarder without having the provision
of unsigncryption. The unsigncryption of the ALLOC message
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Fig. 7. Bipartite graph representation for proposed allocation scheme
is only possible for EVs which authenticates the source of the
message and checks the validity of it in the same process of
signcryption and unsigncryption followed previously. Once the
EV plugins into a charging station, the charging station logs
the hash of the EV’s identity and sent it to the operator on
a regular basis with batch processing. While charging all the
information of the EV is encrypted and saved by itself.
IV. PERFORMANCE AND ANALYSIS
Performance of the proposed system based on computation
cost, communication cost, satisfaction ratio, and slot ratio are
discussed. The performance metrics are compared with the
existing approaches [35][37][38][40]. The selection of these
candidate algorithms for comparison is due to the similar kind
of framework orientation and privacy-preserving work with the
proposed method. Moreover, dynamic tariff decision, priority
and supplier matching are also considered in [37][38][40],
respectively, which gives the base of comparison with the
presented solution. In the following subsections performance
metrics, experiment environment, and results are discussed.
A. Performance metrics
Parameters considered for the evaluation of the secured
framework for EVs are computation cost, communication
cost, satisfaction ratio, slot ratio, charging latency, and load
balancing index. These performance evaluation parameters are
defined first for clarity as below.
1) Computation and communication costs: : Computation
and communications costs are defined in terms of time and
bits, respectively. In the case of computation, each of the
operations in the cryptographic approach consumes some
amount of time and therefore, computation cost measures the
cumulative time whereas the communication represents the
message overhead criteria for any network-based framework
development.
2) Satisfaction Ratio: : This metric is introduced to cal-
culate the satisfaction of the allocation in terms of payoff.





where, Maximum payoff is the probable maximum payoff
amount from the overall system’s execution. The range of SR
is in between of 0 to 1 with maximum value of SR = 1 where
the payoff of the allocation is actually providing the maximum
payoff to the system.
3) Slot ratio:: This metric is introduced to identify the con-
gestion in charging stations. The slot ratio (SL) is calculated
as:
SL =
No. of charging stations
No. of vehicles
(15)
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For a fix the number of charging stations (practically it
is fixed), the increasing number of EVs make the SL ratio
decreasing. It is not practically feasible that SL = 0 as the
number of charging stations cannot be zero. At a certain point
of time SL = 1 where the number of charging stations and
the number of vehicles is equal, optimally balanced load in
the framework. With the increasing number of EVs, SL starts
decreasing further.
4) Charging latency: This metric is an extended one from
the computation cost. In computation cost, only the time for
the message exchange processing is only considered; whereas,
in charging latency the overall time from initiating charging
message to charge completion is measured. Assuming all the
EVs charging capacity is x and charging per unit time µ the
Charging Latency (CL) for a void charged EV is given by,
CL = message exchange time+ Twait + Tchrg (16)
where, message exchange time is actually the communi-
cation cost occurred during the process or verification and
authentication.
5) Load Balancing Index (LBI): : It plays an important role
in the framework, as the overall EV charging time is depending
upon this metric. If load balance is not proper, Twait increases
and as a result charging latency increases. Therefore, load
balancing has been observed and Average Charging Station
Allocation (ACSA) calculated as:
ACSA =
Total number of EV s
Total number of charging station
(17)
B. Experimental environment
In order to evaluate the computation overhead of the pro-
posed scheme and the comparison with existing approaches,
Python charm cryptographic library [50] is used. The comput-
ing machine runs with Intel Core i7-4765T 2.00 GHz and 16
GB RAM. Lattice and bilinear pairing are used with a super
singular elliptic curve with the symmetric Type 1 of size 512
bits (SS512 curve) [51]. 512 bits for an elliptic curve is the
experimented value. The specifications of the EV, aggregator
and operator are inherited from the recent work on EV charg-
ing based on blockchain sensors [35]. However, customization
in the security feature and asymmetric cryptography has been
included additionally in the present framework discussed here.
A High-Level Protocol Specification Language (HLPSL) in
the Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and
Applications (AVISPA) tool has been used for the same. The
specifications are shown in Figure 8.
The above-mentioned specification of the entities are in-
volved in the experimentation and additional system parame-
ters are given in Table III.
C. Results
In this subsection, the performance metrics discussed in the
preceding section are compared with the existing framework
already available and analysed the pros and cons of the




Transmission range of aggregator 50 meters
Transmission range of EV 20-35 meter
Velocity of the EVs (average) 35-40 km/hour
Number of EVs 20
Number of aggregators 10
Number of charging stations 10
SWIFFT hash function bits 512 bits
Lattice encryption bits 512 bits
Keys bits 512 bits
TABLE IV
COMPUTATION COST FOR INDIVIDUAL FUNCTION IN THE PROPOSED
APPROACH
Function Name Time
Bilinear pairing for Elliptic curve selection (T_ecc) 2.80 ms
Scalar multiplication (T_mul) 1.63 ms
Point addition with bilinear pairing (T_addbp) 0.007 ms
Scalar multiplication with lattice (T_mull) 0.012 ms
Point addition with lattice (T_addl) 0.0010 ms
Encryption (T_enc) 0.43 ms
Decryption (T_dec) 0.28 ms
Hash lattice based (T_hash) 0.0002 ms
average (in time) for individual function associated with a
security mechanism through the lattice framework has been
measured and is listed in Table IV. These measurements are
iterated 100 times to obtain the average value of the functions.
Table V compares the computation cost of the presented
framework with the four existing schemes. It shows that the
encryption-decryption process in other schemes is computa-
tionally costlier as compared to the presented work. This
better performance id due to the use of lattice cryptogra-
phy in the solution that makes the process less computing.
Also, signcryption mechanism employed further reduces the
computation time as signature and encryption are logically
done in a single step. For initial setup the computation cost
is (T_ecc) + (T_mul) + (T_addbp) = 4.437ms. The time
for key establishment between aggregator and EV becomes
(T_mull) + (T_addl) = 0.0130ms. Table V classifies the
cost in five parts: initialization, key establishment, authentica-
tion, encryption and decryption. It also shows the cumulative
complexity of the overall proposed algorithms and existing
algorithms in comparison.
The complexities are calculated as the initial set up with
key establishments, authentication-verification and encryption-
decryption where m is the number of aggregators and n is the
number of EV users.
Table V shows an interesting fact that the cost of initial
set up for the proposed scheme is more than the other
approaches in comparison, however, the lattice framework for
keys and signcryption-unsigncryption processes has signifi-
cantly reduced the cumulative computation cost by 11.63%
on average. The comparison of the ‘order of complexity’ for
all schemes is also shown and the proposed scheme is less
complex compared to others. The communication cost for EVs
is charge constrained and hence requires more consideration
for communication cost as compared to other modules. Table
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Fig. 8. Specifications of EV, aggregator and operator
TABLE V
COMPUTATION COST COMPARISON
Initial set up Key establishment Authentication Encryption Decryption Order of Complexity of the overall scheme
Kim et. al. [35] 4.397 0.011 0.677 1.771 1.180 O(n^4+m^2 log(n)
Knirsch et. al. [37] 4.270 0.097 1.233 3.877 2.333 O(n^4 m^2 log(n+m logn)
Nabil et. al. [38] 4.383 0.763 1.447 2.463 2.403 O((n^4+m^2)+m log(n))
Yucel et. al. [40] 4.377 0.134 0.976 4.500 4.124 O(nm^2+n)^4 m log(n)
Proposed scheme 4.437 0.013 0.16 1.43 0.98 O(mn^2+nm log(nm)
VI compares the communication cost of all the considered
schemes. For this comparison, ECC of 512 bits, the random
number is 128 bits, the message of 128 bits, identity of
128 bits and timestamp of 32 bits have been considered. It
is observed that the proposed scheme significantly reduces
the communication overhead by 22.6% , 15.4% , 83.% and
55.8% respectively as compared to the approaches depicted in
[35][37][38][40].
Next, the satisfaction ratio by increasing the number of EVs
from 1 to 20 and aggregators with a fixed number of 10 is
measured. Figure 9 shows the results for the satisfaction ratio.
The presented approach initially starts with a high (maximum)
satisfaction ratio and gradually reduces after 4 EVs in the
network; after 10 EVs it follows a constant satisfaction ration
of approximately 0.58. As the experimental network has 10
aggregators and 10 charging points, with more 10 EVs the
waiting time increases for every EV and therefore, satisfaction
ratio achieves a constant value. It depicts that the proposed
approach is better than the other approaches by increasing
the satisfaction of the EV users by 43.33% on average.
The matching market theory and the payoff observation have
helped in this regard significantly
Moreover, to observe the system’s behaviour in congestion
or waiting state, the satisfaction ratio with respect to the
slot ratio has been considered and is shown in Figure 10.
It shows that up to the slot ratio 1, the satisfaction ratio is
1 and it decreases after that due to the increased congestion
leading to the decreased average slot ratio. However, other
works, except for the scheme in [40], show a low satisfaction
ratio all over irrespective of the slot ratio as they do not
follow a strict matching strategy. Slot ratio is below 1 when
there are a greater number of vehicles exists as compared
with the number of the charging stations. So, whenever,
the slot ratio goes below 1 there is the probability that the























Fig. 9. Comparison of satisfaction ratio with increasing number of EVs
ratio decrease. The graph actually shows this relationship
between that two factors. Therefore, the proposed approach is
beneficial in gaining the overall payoff of satisfaction and also
provides load stability. The constant straight line also suggests
the system’s stability in congestion for matching with charging
stations for the maximized payoff.
The evaluation for charging latency has been calculated with
average values for all the scenarios of 20 EVs, 10 aggregators,
and 10 charging points. These results are shown in Figure
11. It shows that the proposed approach initially faces a low
latency of 42 minutes and increases up to 124 minutes with
the increasing number of vehicles. The other algorithms also
initially start with low latency and gradually latency increases.
In this case all the EVs are considered to have a constant time
of charge filled up. The fact behind the variable latency for
EVs is depending upon less number of EVs at the start and
therefore message exchange time is reduced initially which
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TABLE VI
COMPARISON OF COMMUNICATION COST
Schemes No. of message exchanges with EV Communication cost
Kim et. al. [35] 4 1824 bits
Knirsch et. al. [37] 5 1670 bits
Nabil et. al. [38] 11 8737 bits
Yucel et. al. [40] 7 3200 bits






















































Fig. 11. Comparison of charging latency with the increasing Number of EVs
leads to overall reduced latency. However, with the increasing
number of EVs message exchange increases and latency also
increases accordingly. Moreover, the perfect matching factors
in the presented approach also help in reducing the overall
latency. Statistically, the proposed approach is having 34.7%
reduced latency as compared to the existing approaches.
The purpose of using the matching market and payoff
generation is to balance the load of charging stations leading
to reduced waiting time and hence overall reduction in latency.
Therefore, loads of the charging stations have been compared
to evaluate the efficiency of the proposed approach. Figure


























Fig. 12. Comparison of load balance with increasing number of charging
stations and average load balance = 0.5
on the load balancing factor. The number of charging stations
is fixed at 10 and varied the EVs from 5 to 20. Therefore,
the average load of the charging stations ranges from 0.5 to
2.0. The load for each of the charging stations is measured
and shown in Figure 12-15 with the comparison of other
approaches.
Figure 12-15 shows four different scenarios (in terms of
average load balance) with a number of EVs ranging from 5
to 20. The load balance data for each of the charging stations is
plotted and blue solid lines in the figures represent the average
load balance value. The observation from each of the figures
depicts that the load in the proposed system is more balanced
compared to the other approaches. The peaks in the graphs
show the deviation of the systems from the balanced load.
The market matching and maximum payoff calculation signif-
icantly contribute to this load balance and hence, the proposed
system is suitable for IoT based EV charging framework. It is
clear from the experimental results that the efficiency of the
proposed work better and the feasibility of the method in an
EV charging infrastructure perspective.
D. Security Analysis
The use of lattice cryptography in the proposed work
significantly enhances the security and privacy of the EV
charging framework. For privacy, the presented work provides
anonymity through signcryption by hiding the EVs infor-
mation while charging as the charging station is only able
to record the pseudoidentity of the EVs for log purpose.
The security proof and related analysis of basic lattice-based
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TABLE VII
COMPARISON OF SECURITY FEATURES
Kim et. al. [35] Knirsch et. al. [37] Nabil et. al.[38] Yucel et. al. [40] Proposed scheme
Confidentiality Yes No Yes No Yes
Authentication Yes No No Yes Yes
Digital signature Yes No No No Yes
Integrity Yes No No No Yes
Non-repudiation Yes No No No Yes

























Fig. 13. Comparison of load balance with increasing number of charging




























Fig. 14. Comparison of load balance with increasing number of charging
stations and average load balance = 1.5
cryptography are already shown in many recent publications
[52][53][54].Therefore, the contribution on the basis of secu-
rity services, viz., confidentiality, authentication and hash, non-
repudiation and privacy has been discussed here. It is worth to
mention that no separate attacker module is used for security
analysis in the study. Rather, lattice signcryption is emphasized
and security is measured in terms of security services. This
shows the proposed work is robust against security attacks in
the above said services. EVs and aggregators are considered




























Fig. 15. Comparison of load balance with increasing number of charging
stations and average load balance = 2.0
therefore any communication to and fro among them need
authentication.
Confidentiality: This security service is provided by using the
signcryption method. It uses a hash of 512 bits, encryption-
decryption keys of 512 bits, message size of 128 bits block
and a random number of 128 bits. The keys are generated
using the random basis of 512 bits. Therefore, an attack for a








512 perm() is the selection of a random bit out
of 512 bits with value 0 or 1. The probability of identifying a
single bit in the signcryption process is 1/Bitcostconfidentiality
and which is approximately equal to zero. Therefore, it is
observed that confidentiality is ensured in the presented work.
Digital signature: Authentication has been ensured by the
use of a digital signature. However, the signature is not
executed as a separate step; rather, it has been included in
a single logical step of signcryption. The probability of two






′)× P (H1 = H2)
(18)
This approximately equals to 0.000000000034 as P (H1 =
H2)→ 0, Psign1=sign2 → 0 eventually.
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Non-repudiation: The message exchange between the entities
uses signcryption and therefore, each message transmission
ensures non-repudiation with its signature.
Privacy: EVs or aggregators are prone to get controlled by the
attackers to perform malicious tasks. Moreover, the location
of the EVs and other information need to be secured in the
process. To achieve, this aspect, hash of the EV information
is used before transmission and hashed value and the mapping
is stored by the operator. Aggregators are customized for
provisioning only with a forward mechanism to the operator
so that the privacy and confidentiality can be maintained. The
security features of the existing works of [35][37][38][40] are
compared, as shown in Table VII.
Table VII shows that Kim et. al. [35] possesses the sim-
ilar features; however, the computational complexity on the
blockchain is higher as compared to lattice-based signcryption
techniques. The other existing approaches are able to provide
privacy but unable to execute other security services as re-
quired. Therefore, from the security point of view also, the
proposed solution is efficient as a secure framework for EV
charging in IoT infrastructure. The description of symbols and
variables used are listed in Table VIII.
V. CONCLUSION
In the present work, a framework for electric vehicle
charging in IoT infrastructure has been developed with lattice
cryptography. The signcryption has been used to generate the
keys for convenience and simplicity. Moreover, the market
matching theory with maximum payoff calculation has been
additionally considered on multi-parameters viz., distance,
remaining charge and waiting time. Furthermore, two new
performance metrics are identified to locate EV charging
stations to the vehicles. The experimental and comparative
analysis based on latency, satisfaction and load balance have
significantly improved with this framework. The security anal-
ysis in this aspect also confirms that the presented solution is
able to withstand against any post-quantum computing attacks.
In short, the proposed method is able to handle confidentiality-
authentication attacks in terms of security. The allocation of
blockchain to this framework to check some specific attacks
is an interesting step forward and will be considered in
the future.The trust management in aggregators is another
extended future research problem.
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